Logics for Information Aggregation

With the amount of information to us today, making sense of potentially conflicting information is a problem that we are bound to run into. We aim to study this problem from the perspective of epistemic logic. So far, we have studied logics for reasoning about information distributed across groups of agents in the epistemic logic framework, focusing on the notion of distributed belief. We have introduced the notions of cautious and bold distributed belief. These are intended as alternatives to the standard distributed belief, behaving better when agents have conflicting beliefs. With standard distributed belief, such situations lead to explosion: everything becomes distributedly believed. The idea behind the new notions is that we look at maximal consistent subgroups, allowing us to meaningfully express that a group collectively possesses information supporting a belief, also in cases where some group members disagree. Going forward, we are interested in continuing to explore the aggregation of potentially conflicting information in the setting of epistemic logic, e.g. by looking at distributed belief in richer extensions of epistemic logic and in relation to other areas that deal with similar problems.