Transferable Environment Poisoning: Training-time Attack on Reinforcement Learning

Hang Xu (Nanyang Technological University), Rundong Wang (Nanyang Technological University), Lev Raizman (University of Waterloo), Zinovi Rabinovich (Nanyang Technological University)

Abstract

Studying adversarial attacks on Reinforcement Learning (RL) agents has become a key aspect of developing robust, RL-based solutions. Test-time attacks, which target the post-learning performance of an RL agent's policy, have been well studied in both white-and black-box settings. More recently, however, state-of-the-art works have shifted to investigate training-time attacks on RL agents, i.e., forcing the learning process towards a target policy designed by the attacker. Alas, these SOTA works continue to rely on white-box settings and/or use a reward-poisoning approach. In contrast, this paper studies environment-dynamics poisoning attacks at training time. Furthermore, while environment-dynamics poisoning presumes a transfer-learning capable agent, it also allows us to expand our approach to black-box attacks. Our overall framework, inspired by hierarchical RL, seeks the minimal environment-dynamics manipulation that will prompt the momentary policy of the agent to change in a desired manner. We show the attack efficiency by comparing it with the reward-poisoning approach, and empirically demonstrate the transferability of the environment-poisoning attack strategy. Finally, we seek to exploit the transferability of the attack strategy to handle black-box settings.