Rank Aggregation by Dissatisfaction Minimisation in the Unavailable Candidate Model

Arnaud Grivet Sébert (Université Paris-Saclay, CEA, List), Nicolas Maudet (LIP6, UMR 7606, Sorbonne Université), Patrice Perny (LIP6, UMR 7606, Sorbonne Université), Paolo Viappiani (LIP6, UMR 7606, CNRS & Sorbonne Université)

Abstract

In this paper, we extend the unavailable candidate model [10] and present two new voting rules based on a finer notion of disagreement, called dissatisfaction, which depends on the ranks of the candidates, considered among all the candidates (ex ante dissatisfaction rule) or only among the available candidates (ex post dissatisfaction rule). We provide algorithmic results for the two rules and show that apparently very different voting rules such as scoring rules or Kemeny rule can be unified under the same aggregation concept: expectation of dissatisfaction under the availability distribution.