Manipulability of Thiele Methods on Party-List Profiles

Recent impossibility results have shown that strategyproofness is difficult to obtain for multiwinner voting rules, especially in combination with proportionality. In this paper, we attempt to identify cases where strategyproofness can be established by considering manipulation on party-list profiles. We distinguish between three types of manipulation-subset-manipulation, supersetmanipulation, and disjoint-set-manipulation. Our focus is the class of irresolute Thiele rules. For all three types of manipulation, we are able to establish that Thiele rules are strategyproof on party-list profiles for several well-known preference extensions. For supersetand disjoint-set-strategyproofness, we can extend this result to all preference extensions. We are also able to show that Thiele rules are fully strategyproof for optimistic agents on these profiles.