Strategyproof and Fair Matching Mechanism for Ratio Constraints

We introduce a new type of distributional constraints called ratio constraints, which explicitly specify the required balance among schools in two-sided matching. Since ratio constraints do not belong to the known well-behaved class of constraints called M-convex set, developing a fair and strategyproof mechanism that can handle them is challenging. We develop a novel mechanism called Quota Reduction Deferred Acceptance (QRDA), which repeatedly applies the standard DA by sequentially reducing artificially introduced maximum quotas. As well as being fair and strategyproof, QRDA always obtains a weakly better matching for students compared to a baseline mechanism called Artificial Cap Deferred Acceptance (ACDA), which uses predetermined artificial maximum quotas. Experimentally, QRDA performs better in terms of student welfare and nonwastefulness than ACDA and another fair and strategyproof mechanism called Extended Seat Deferred Acceptance (ESDA), in which ratio constraints are transformed into minimum/maximum quotas.