SPECTRE: A Game Theoretic Framework for Preventing Collusion in Security Games (Demonstration)

Shahrzad Gholami (University of Southern California), Bryan Wilder (University of Southern California), Matthew Brown (University of Southern California), Arunesh Sinha (University of Southern California), Nicole Sintov (University of Southern California), Milind Tambe (University of Southern California)

Abstract

Several models have been proposed for Stackelberg security games (SSGs) and protection against perfectly rational and bounded rational adversaries; however, none of these existing models addressed the destructive cooperation mechanism between adversaries. SPECTRE (Strategic Patrol planner to Extinguish Collusive ThREats) takes into account the synergistic destructive collusion among two groups of adversaries in security games. This framework is designed for the purpose of efficient patrol scheduling for security agents in security games in presence of collusion and is mainly build up on game theoretic approaches, optimization techniques, machine learning methods and theories for human decision making under risk. The major advantage of SPECTRE is involving real world data from human subject experiments with participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT).